Normativity and Reference in a Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion by Ferreira, M. Jamie
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 18 Issue 4 Article 4 
10-1-2001 
Normativity and Reference in a Wittgensteinian Philosophy of 
Religion 
M. Jamie Ferreira 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Ferreira, M. Jamie (2001) "Normativity and Reference in a Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion," Faith 
and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 18 : Iss. 4 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
NORMATIVITY AND REFERENCE IN A 
WITTGENSTEINIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
M. Jamie Ferreira 
It is a common objection that Wittgenstein fails to reflect accurately what 
religious believers are doing-that is, that he is offering prescription, rather 
than description. Because this misgiving seriously jeopardizes the possibili-
ty of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, [ focus in this article on the 
issues of description, reference, and normativity in Wittgenstein's account 
of religion. My defense of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion exam-
ines the source of normativity and the implications of the norm of 
"absoluteness" for the possibility of rational justification. 
In its presentation of currents in 20th century philosophy of religion, A 
Companion to Philosophy of Religion (1997) includes an essay on 
"Wittgensteinianism."J Its author, John Hyman, suggesting that the "best 
introduction to Wittgensteinianism is Wittgenstein," separates his treat-
ments of the early and later Wittgenstein, and finally offers the following 
assessment: "Is Wittgenstein's account of religious belief convincing? I 
doubt it."2 The main problem seems to stem from what Hyman calls "one 
of the fundamental themes of Wittgenstein's later philosophy"-namely, 
"that the concepts we use cannot be justified by reference to reality."3 As 
Hyman rephrases it: "Grammar itself is arbitrary, i.e., not accountable to 
any reality." Presumably, what is behind Hyman's objection is that at least 
in the case of religious belief Wittgenstein fails to reflect accurately what 
religious believers are doing. It is a common objection that Wittgenstein is 
offering prescription, rather than description. Because these misgivings 
about the possibility of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion continue 
to have a prominent place in the literature, I want to focus in what follows 
on the issues of description, reference, and normativity in Wittgenstein's 
account of religious belief. I need to begin, however, by asking in a formal 
way what it is a philosophy of religion ought to be doing. 
1. The Preliminary Question 
What kind of philosophy is philosophy of religion? The formal 
answer is that it is a kind of philosophical thinking which can retain its 
integrity as philosophy at the same time as it does justice to religious tradi-
tions. The question is answered descriptively for us by recounting the 
ways in which what we count as philosophy (or philosophical traditions) 
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can do justice to what we count as religion (or religious traditions). Just as 
there is more than one philosophical approach, so there may be more than 
one kind of philosophy of religion. Even if we were to consider philoso-
phy as the single enterprise of clear thinking and analysis, with the objec-
tives of determining reference and truth, there are different approaches to 
these goals-some possibilities include philosophical approaches which go 
tmder the names hermeneutical, phenomenological, analytic, deconstruc-
tive, or existentialist. Our list cannot include any philosophical approaches 
which fail to remain philosophical when they analyze religion, nor can it 
include any philosophical approaches which do not actually engage with 
what we count as religion; the first would issue in 'a caricature of philoso-
phy of religion' and the second would issue in 'philosophy of a caricature 
of religion.' In this respect our descriptive list is already a normative one. 
Don't we, however, have to know what religion is before we can see 
what kind of philosophical thinking illuminates it philosophically? And 
isn't that precisely what philosophy of religion is supposed to reveal? This 
is precisely the same kind of circle involved in all our coming to under-
stand anything. Coming to understand is never an all-or-nothing matter; 
we can only pick out phenomena if we approach experience theory-laden 
(with at least some minimal level of theoretical framework), but our initial 
framework does not necessarily remain unchanged as we deepen our 
acquaintance with the phenomena. Understanding just is dialectical (as 
Comte made clear) or hermeneutical. The kind of philosophical approach 
we need in order to study any phenomenon is first and foremost the kind 
of philosophical approach which looks to see what that phenomenon says 
and shows of itself. In this sense a phenomenological approach is not one 
among many choices, but a fundamental dimension of any philosophy 
which attempts to be philosophy of anything, biology or religion. The 
importance of this level of phenomenological analysis is highlighted in 
Wittgenstein's advice--"One cannot guess how a word functions. One has 
to look at its use and learn from that."4 Wittgenstein's directive not to 
guess, but to look at use, as well as his philosophical sensitivity to differ-
ences, mark his philosophical approach as one which strikingly reminds us 
that we cannot tell a priori what kind of grammar informs a given dis-
course and warns us against imposing alien grammars. 
There are two putative attempts to do philosophy of religion which ulti-
mately undermine themselves. First, a philosophical approach to religion 
which assumes that all realities have the same grammar (namely, the one 
most easily applied to the most common kinds of reality we experience) 
will issue in a 'philosophy of superficially observed religious phenomena.' 
Such accounts prematurely close off the possibility of philosophy of reli-
gion, refusing to let religious traditions say and show what they are.s 
A second putative attempt to do philosophy of religion fails in the oppo-
site way. Any attempt to address philosophically a reality which is already 
affirmed as not amenable to philosophical analysis or universal conceptu-
alization will undermine itself. For example, if we take the view that reli-
gion is not a cultural or spiritual product but something which breaks 
through into culture, an irruptive revelation which cannot be universally 
conceptualized, and that, by definition, the philosophical enterprise 
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(human philosophical concepts) cannot do justice to a transcendent reality 
which breaks into human culture, there can be no philosophy of religion.6 
A study of religion which demands that a response to the unconditional be 
itself unconditioned undermines itself. Philosophy is co-opted by this 
view of the religious as unconditional revelation. Moreover, such a view 
fails to appreciate that revelation, as Aquinas reminds us, is always 
received according to the mode of the receiver. It does not make sense to 
say that a reality to which we respond could in principle be studied inde-
pendently of our response--we have no other access. Insofar as religion is 
seen as an unconditional, absolute revelation breaking into human con-
sciousness, a revelation to which our concepts cannot apply, there cannot 
be philosophy of religion. In sum, certain philosophical approaches do not 
admit of philosophy of religion, and certain views of religion do not admit 
of philosophy of religion. 
II. Some Qualifications 
First, religion is the originary phenomenon for philosophy of religion. 
Even Hegel recognized that philosophy cannot create religion; it can at most 
analyze and unfold it. But this only means that if there were no religion, 
there could be no philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion must, in 
addition, be done 'on the basis of religion,' in the sense that one must take 
religion in situ, in its own context, on its own terms. One must, in that sense, 
go 'inside.' However, for some people the paradigms of being 'inside' are 
Aquinas and Anselm. I suggest, however, that there is a way of treating reli-
gion on its own terms which does not require an acceptance of faith commit-
ments. A hermeneutical and contextualized appreciation of religion's self-
understanding seems possible without actually making the commitment of 
faith; the illuminating value of such an account is increased to the extent that 
it describes at least some important historical religious traditions. 
Secondly, it is important to note that the contrast between philosophy 
done inside a set of assumptions and philosophy which thematizes and 
problematises these assumptions can only be useful if we have already 
addressed the question of what (and whether the same thing) is being 
assumed. The determination of whether someone is working within cer-
tain framework assumptions or putting them in question assumes they we 
know what these assumptions consist in, what they mean, what they refer 
to. That is, issues of meaning and reference logically precede the determi-
nation of whether someone is working internally or externally. If we sim-
ply assume that one group does not put the 'being' or 'reality' of God in 
question and the other does, as if what they hold or question is obviously 
the same, we prejudice our chances of appreciating what is being 
assumed-that is, what the 'being' or 'reality' of God amounts to. 
Questions of language (meaning and reference) are logically first. 
Because the philosophy in a philosophy of religion must do justice to 
both itself and religion, philosophy of religion should not let its apprecia-
tion of the multivalence of language lead to the abandonment of concerns 
with reference and truth. For many people that concern with reference and 
truth is expressed in terms of 'ontology,' 'reality,' or the 'being of God: 
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1be goal seems clear: philosophy of religion must be non-reductive (must 
maintain the irreducibility of the religious) at the same time as it does not 
abandon the relevance of questions of reference and truth. However, the 
means to that goal are not obvious. 
My own way of phrasing the goal is as follows: a philosophy of religion 
which does justice to both philosophy and religion is only possible if one's 
philosophical approach involves both a genuine description and a genuine 
openness to the infinite, the unconditional, the 'more' (whether construed as 
excess or gift). On the one hand, only a conunitment to description can pre-
clude foisting an alien grammar on religious discourse: we need to appreci-
ate what religious people say and do, as well as appreciate their saying in a 
nuanced way, which does not impose a common grammar on everything. 
Not everything that looks like description is; not everything that has the 
form of an indicative is one. On the other hand, only those philosophical 
approaches which problematize closure and determinability and decidabili-
ty can even be candidates for philosophy of religion. (However, an empha-
sis on undecidability should not preclude the decidability which expresses 
itself in responsibility for the other--e.g., in terms of moral responsibility or 
conscience.) The philosophy in philosophy of religion must affirm our exis-
tence as dynamic loci of reflective embodied becoming, and our consequent 
fallibility and the corrigibility of our claims, without translating these limits 
into the scepticism of a reified noumenal world beyond appearance. While 
the attack on closure and totalization is also found in thinkers like 
Kierkegaard, Levinas, and Derrida/ I tum to Wittgenstein's thought for fur-
ther elaboration, since his methodology starkly highlights both the role of 
description and the non-sceptical limits of determinability.s Moreover, like 
Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein offers resources for understanding religious belief 
in terms of imaginative reconceptualization, which seems to me an impor-
tant way of doing justice to the debate over cognitive vs. non-cognitive 
accounts. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein's approach is consonant with 
religious thinkers as different from each other as Aquinas and Kierkegaard. 
III. The Problem of Description 
There is no question but that description must play an important role in 
philosophy of religion: the philosophy in philosophy of religion has to be 
one which looks at the discourse and practice concerning religious reality 
in order to appreciate its distinctive character, to obtain clarity about what 
religion says and shows of itself. Because Wittgenstein's philosophical 
approach places description front and center, I want to develop further the 
ways in which an account of religion can be faithful to Wittgenstein's com-
mitments and to religion's commitments at the same time. (Since 
Wittgenstein limits himself to Christian religion, it would be more precise 
to say that I want to develop the ways in which Wittgenstein's account of 
Christian religion is faithful to Christian religion.) 
Precisely the descriptive aim which I am suggesting makes 
Wittgenstein's approach potentially useful for philosophy of religion has, 
however, been the target of criticism. For Wittgenstein, as we all know, 
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can 
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in the end only describe it" (PI, §124). Michael Dummett is typical of those 
who see this as too limited a goal for philosophy. Dummett writes: 
We all stand, or should stand, in the shadow of Wittgenstein, in the 
same way that much earlier generations once stood in the shadow of 
Kant; ... Some things in his philosophy, however, I cannot see any rea-
son for accepting: one is the belief that philosophy, as such, must 
never criticize but only describe.9 
On Dummett's view, philosophy must assess or evaluate, not merely 
describe-that is, Wittgensteinian philosophy does not go far enough; it 
ought to do more than describe. 
On the other hand, it is also a common complaint that Wittgenstein's 
account of religion goes too far, by going beyond the description to which he 
should limit himself. On such a view, Wittgenstein's lectures on religious 
belief do not "reflect his commitment to description" because they include 
criticisms which are inconsistent with his commitment to description. lO For 
example, they contain a criticism of a (type of) believer (O'Hara) who 
appeals to rational justification for religious belief; this is taken by some to 
reveal that Wittgenstein's concern is "not to investigate the use of religious 
concepts among believers like O'Hara, but to propose his own theory of the 
logic of religious belief and to denounce other intelpretations as 'mistaken' 
and as 'superstition."'ll 
Thus, the objection to Wittgenstein's understanding of description in 
relation to philosophy of religion takes three main forms. He is sometimes 
accused of having no normative standard independent of actual usage-
the standard just repeats or echoes actual usage, and so cannot be used to 
evaluate any usage. At other times the concern is that Wittgenstein does 
have a normative understanding, but it is either one whose basis is never 
made explicit or it is one which (whatever the norms) is inconsistent with 
his commitment to description. 
Any judgment of the relevance or usefulness of Wittgenstein's approach 
to religion depends on coming to tem1S with what it means to say that the 
task of philosophy lies in description. D.Z. Phillips has repeatedly 
addressed himself to this issue, but his response has not, I think, been ade-
quately appreciated; the charge that a Wittgensteinian account precludes 
critical evaluation of religious claims continues to dog any attempt to pro-
vide a Wittgensteinian account of religion which is not fideistic. Therefore, 
I want to do two things. First I want to build on Phillips's work in show-
ing the critical potential of Wittgenstein's descriptive methodology for reli-
gion!2; this involves appreciating the transformative goal of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. Second, I want to show how Wittgenstein's evaluations of cer-
tain understandings of religion are not inconsistent with his commitment 
to description, but are derived from that commitment. 
IV. Transformative Description 
Phillips has reminded us of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideal: "I ought 
to be no more than a mirror in which my reader can see his own thinking 
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with all its deformities so that helped in this way, he can put it right."13 It 
seems clear that, for Wittgenstein, philosophy has a goal, and the goal is a 
clarity which transforms us or helps us to "put it right." He notes the 
philosopher's intention to transform when he tells us that a philosopher 
says '''Look at things like this!' ... [although] that doesn't ensure that people 
will look at things like that" (CV, 61 [1947]). When Wittgenstein refers to 
the "results of philosophy" as a valuable" discovery" (PI, §119), he is echo-
ing his earlier desideratum of "a change in our style of thinking" (LC, 28), 
often a very radical change. 
This goal-oriented mirroring is accomplished through description. 
Wittgenstein insists that "We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place .... [Philosophical] problems are 
solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known" (PI, §109). But description itself is not easy to describe. J4 
What description involves must be inferred from Wittgenstein's other for-
mulations of the task and goal of philosophy. For example, philosophy is a 
"battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" 
(PI, §109)-that is, a battle against the goings-astray which are occasioned 
by the homogeneous appearance of language. But it is technically a battle 
within philosophy, not a battle waged by philosophers against other peo-
ple's confusions; it is a battle against bewitched ways of doing philosophy, 
including philosophy in religion. According to Wittgenstein, "the work of 
the philosopher consists in assembling reminders together for a particular 
purpose (PI, §127)-for him or herself as much as for anyone else. 
Wittgenstein wants to cause a change--the kind of change that happens 
when one sees that one was under an illusion and no longer needs to hold 
to a certain idea or perspective. His is a transformative philosophy meant 
to dispel illusions (which explains his praise of Kierkegaard15). He wants 
us to look hard at Christianity, because it is often hard to see what is right 
in front of us (CV, 39 [1940]); indeed, "looking intently is difficult. And it's 
possible to look intently without seeing anything" (CV, 74 [1948]). He 
urges us to "look and say what it's really like-but you must see some-
thing that throws new light on the facts" (CV, 39 [1941]). Seeing what is 
there may require a change in how we look at it. If in fact we are under 
any illusion about what we are looking at, we will need to be helped to see 
it differently (but we won't be being helped to see something other than it). 
In sum, Wittgenstein's philosophical method is transforming, but not 
reforming. 
Two questions arise here. How can description inaugurate change in 
the practitioner? And how can the philosophical describer intend such 
change without also intending to revise the practice at issue? To answer 
these questions is to locate Wittgenstein's source of critical normativity. 
V. The Source ofNormativity 
Wittgenstein does have a normative understanding of what constitutes 
the religious dimension of religious belief; he is obviously guided by some 
normative standard when he makes assessments like the following: "if this 
is religious belief, then it's all superstition" because "whatever believing in 
WITTGENSTEINIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 449 
God may be, it can't be believing in something we can test, or find means 
of testing" (LC, 59-60); "Religious faith and superstition are quite different. 
One of them results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is a 
trusting" (CV, 72 [1948]). 
That he did not want to go beyond description is clear from his own 
conclusion that it would be arrogant of him to try to tell religious believers 
what they should do-his job is only to describe what implications ("con-
sequences" or "conventions") believers draw from the techniques they use 
(LC, 71-2). Does he keep to this, or does his critique of certain views as 
"superstition" rather than "religious faith" reveal an imported standard of 
normativity? Does he end up, malgrc lui, imposing an alien grammar on 
religious belief? 
The crucial question is how Wittgenstein's normative understanding is 
authorized. I suggest that Wittgenstein works self-consciously from a nor-
mative understanding derived from his description of what he sees as at 
stake for religious believers on their own terms. Wittgenstein's description 
is a peculiar sort. If we simply count noses we will not be doing descrip-
tion in the way Wittgenstein intends. What Wittgenstein is advocating is a 
description of the nonns generated in practice. (Perhaps we could corre-
late this with the contrast he makes in his lectures on aesthetics between 
describing a variety of lines and color patches and describing the expres-
sion on a face [LC, 34-35].) In other words, he calls for a description of the 
prescription within the practice-and this might entail a challenge to cer-
tain self-descriptions given by practitioners. Philosophy in religion looks 
at how the words are being used, since "practice gives the words their 
sense."!1> Philosophy in religion looks at use to determine content-to 
determine what is meant and how reference is being made. It looks at how 
theological claims function for the people who affirm them; therefore, it 
doesn't limit itself to examination of theological utterances in the abstract, 
but sees them in their practical context. Description amounts to descrip-
tion of grammar!7: "Essence is expressed by grammar" (PI, §371); 
"Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)" 
(PI, §373). But already we see that description is a complex activity 
because the claim that "everything lies open to view" (PI, §126) must be 
seen in tandem with Wittgenstein's claim that we must distinguish 
between superficial and depth grammar: "A main source of our failure to 
understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our 
words.--Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous 
representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing 
collilexions'" (Pt §122). Description is not simply empirical generalization. 
The determination of the depth grammar of a discourse is only able to be 
made through description of what is observed, but it is a determination of 
the deep structures, the nonns embedded within a given discourse. 
Wittgenstein allows the possibility that someone who uses a particular 
grammar overall (in general) can make mistakes in particular instances, as 
well as that people can be confused about aspects of their own practice. 
Philosophy ought to mirror practices so as to reveal any confusions which 
may exist (they don't necessarily exist) in the accounts even participants 
give. In other words, philosophy cannot be limited to reporting whatever 
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any religious believer says about him or herself-this is not what philoso-
phy in general does, so it cannot be what philosophy of religion does. In 
this sense, questions of meaning, truth, and successful reference must 
remain in play. The change in our perspective results from the way the 
practices are mirrored, highlighting things for us in such a way that impli-
cations are brought home and incongruities show up. As Phillips explains: 
by looking (but only by looking) at some of the things people do can we 
criticize other things they do.1s Wittgenstein suggests some forms of (and 
sources of) confusion, and this should instigate some change in our per-
spective, but he does not try to revise or reform the practice of religious 
belief. As Phillips reminds us, clarification of grammar is not reforming-
it is not turning religious belief into something else, but revealing what it 
says and shows of itself. 
Although clarification of grammar can be transforming, it is not reform-
ing. Wittgenstein is, in effect, challenging the simplistic dichotomy 
between description and prescription. Description can lead to change in 
how we see something, but as long as the change is guided by what is 
revealed as internal to what we are looking at, it will not require a revision 
of what we are looking at. Wittgenstein is not intending to revise the prac-
tice of (Christian) religion; he is not recommending ways to reform it. He 
is, he says, hoping to help us to see certain aspects of it from a fresh per-
spective. But we must still be taking (Christian) religion on its own terms, 
rather than revising it. Although we might say that transforming our view 
of X or transforming us in the way we see X (which Wittgenstein does call 
for when confusions need to be addressed) amounts to revising our view 
of X, this is not the same thing as revising X (which Wittgenstein does not 
call for). It is this latter lack of revisionary intent which is referred to in his 
much-contested claim that "philosophy may in no way interfere with the 
actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it .. .It leaves every-
thing as it is" (PI, §124). 
Wittgenstein repeatedly appeals to Christian teaching: "Remember that 
the Christian religion does not consist in saying a lot of prayers, in fact we 
are commanded just the opposite. If you and I are to live religious lives, it 
must not just be that we talk a lot about religion, but that in some ways our 
livE'S are different./l19 In the comment I noted earlier, he describes a norm 
he observed: "If I even vaguely remember what I was taught about Cod, I 
might say" that believing in God cannot be believing in something we can 
test. A similar description of a norm is expressed in the following com-
ment: "But I think that what believers who have furnished such proofs [for 
the existence of God] have wanted to do is to give their 'belief' an intellec-
tual analysis and foundation, although they themselves would never have 
come to believe as a result of such proofs" (CV, 85). He reports that he 
finds believers making a practical appeal to retrospective (rather than 
prospective)2D justification. He is describing what he (looking closely at 
them) thinks believers are wanting or trying to do: their speaking about 
"proofs" is examined in the light of their additional behavior. He is not 
prescribing goals for them or telling them what they should want; he is 
describing their goals as they appear in their practice. Prescription is not 
part of his descriptive approach; it is what description reveals. 21 
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A similar description of a norm is found in his lectures on religious 
belief, where he concludes that "They [religious believers] don't treat this 
as a matter of reasonability" (LC, 58). He is drawing a conclusion from his 
observation of religious believers.22 Now it looks like this conclusion is 
contradicted by the behavior of the personage, Fr. O'Hara, who is criticized 
by Wittgenstein precisely for treating it as a "matter of reasonability." Why 
doesn't Wittgenstein think that O'Hara's treatment of religious belief 
undermines his claim that "they don't treat this as a matter of reasonabili-
ty"? Who is the they who don't treat it as a matter of reasonability? How 
could Wittgenstein still be describing if he criticizes a practitioner? If we 
consider this example in the light of other examples of description of 
norms, we do not need to see Wittgenstein as being simply dogmatic 
and/ or inconsistent. 
It is possible to understand Wittgenstein in one of two ways, either of 
which allows him to be consistently describing the norms he sees in place 
in (Christian) religion. Wittgenstein may be describing two norms, one of 
which he takes to be a more generally held norm than Fr. O'Hara's norm, 
and which authorizes criticism of Fr. O'Hara's appeal to rational justifica-
tion; in this case, he is observing that they (the majority of practitioners) 
don't treat it as reasonable in order to criticize the exceptional cases in 
which some (a minority of practitioners) do. We could, of course, ask why 
one norm is better than the other. What Wittgenstein is more likely doing, 
however, is describing a norm to which all religious believers hold, even 
O'Hara, and describing how O'Hara's behavior belies his own claims to be 
treating religious belief in terms of rational justification. 
Strictly speaking, Wittgenstein does not limit himself to describing the 
implications believers draw from their explicit commitments. He describes 
tlleir commitments; in addition, either he describes the conclusions they 
draw or he actually draws out the implications that are ingredient in their 
commitments. Wittgenstein appeals to a description of norms in place and 
then to descriptions of either the implications drawn by believers or the 
unrecognized implications of their commitments. But the important thing 
is that his normative understanding is derived ultimately from description 
of religious commitments. There is no suggestion that believers ought to 
have certain commitments, but that in fact they do, even though they 
sometimes act in ways which are in tension with them. 
Thus, Wittgenstein is not recommending how religious believers should 
treat their religious beliefs, but observing how they do (that is, they follow 
in general a grammar which precludes the decisive relevance of counter-
evidence) in order to criticize them on the occasions when they suggest 
that they are relying on evidence for their beliefs. It is only from some of 
the things believers do that we can tell whether or not they ought to do 
other things. In other words, I am arguing that although Wittgenstein 
clearly does make a normative judgment when he decides not to take Fr. 
O'Hara's self-understanding as normative of religion, it is not a judgment 
imported from outside, so to speak-it is a judgment which he sees as 
lying deeply within religion, even within O'Hara's religion. 
Of course, if Wittgenstein is going to truly limit himself to description of 
religion's self-admitted commitments, he would have to forego any nega-
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tive evaluation of O'Hara's religiousness if (but only if) O'Hara failed to be 
committed to something which precluded his purported reliance on ratio-
nal justification for religious belief. Wittgenstein's case depends on 
O'Hara's sharing with other religious believers something which implies 
that he too is committed to not treating religious belief as a matter of rea-
sonability. And Wittgenstein discovers this in Christian theology. 
IV. The Norm of ABSOLUTENESS 
I want to argue that Wittgenstein's early understanding of religion high-
lights for us what he finds in Christian theology which authorizes him to 
criticize practitioners, like Fr. O'Hara, who make natural theology a foun-
dation of religious belief (or who treat historical information as supportive 
of religious belief). His sense that absoluteness is a distinctive characteris-
tic of what is "higher," hence distinctive of religion, accounts for his atten-
tion to that dimension in the examples he considers later on. The theology 
of the Christian religion seems to Wittgenstein to confirm that religious 
propositions set a task-they direct us to treat the world under the per-
spective of the absolute, the unconditional. 
In the case of his criticism of O'Hara, Wittgenstein is making the judg-
ment that a commitment to absoluteness is taken to be normative in 
Christian religion, including in O'Hara's understanding of religion, and 
that this commitment is at odds with one technique O'Hara uses. 
Wittgenstein writes: "But I would ridicule it not by saying it is based on 
insufficient reasons. I would say: here is a man who is cheating himself. 
You can say: this man is ridiculous because he believes, and bases it on 
weak reasons" (LC, 59). Some things O'Hara does are evaluated in the 
light of other things O'Hara does. Wittgenstein assumes that this commit-
ment to absoluteness is non-negotiable, since O'Hara himself is theological-
ly committed to the view that God is sui generis, not an object like others; 
thus O'Hara's reliance on reasons creates a confusion on his own terms. 
Moreover, O'Hara himself refuses to take negative evidence into account 
in the usual ways; thus O'Hara's appeal to reasons or arguments does not 
indicate an actual reliance on them. 
It is appropriate to ask here: how central to Wittgenstein's thought is 
this understanding of religion's own norm of absoluteness? Is it something 
we need to bring in in order to make him consistent rather than something 
stressed in his own writings? And even if we find it present, is it a continu-
ing presence, informing his later work? 
The clearest formulation of absoluteness as normative in religion is 
found in the early "Lecture on Ethics" (1929). The central distinction he 
draws is between judgments of absolute value and judgments of relative 
value. The "absolute sense" applies to judgments concerning the "good," 
the "valuable," the "really important," the "meaning of life," and the 
"right" way of living.23 He treats these ethical terms as interchangeable 
both with "aesthetics" and with "religion." The notions of an absolutely 
right road or an absolute good are extended to religion in Wittgenstein's 
parallel example of absolute safety and absolute tmst; such references to 
religious absoluteness are, he says, a misuse of language which only seem 
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meaningful because we assume they are analogous to relative safety or rel-
ative trust (which involve counter-factual conditions I can enumerate or 
identify). But the inexhaustibility and ll1.determinacy which are constitu-
tive of the religious absoluteness make it a paradoxical claim. Wittgenstein 
boldly uses the word "paradox" to describe the attempt to ascribe absolute 
value to what is in fact contingent, the felt need to go outside the world on 
the basis of what is in the world: "It is the paradox that an experience, a 
fact, should seem to have supernatural value" (PO, 43). On the contrary, 
"no state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive 
power of an absolute judge" (PO,40). 
Wittgenstein includes himself among those who "are still tempted to 
use such expressions as 'absolute good,' and 'absolute value'" (PO, 40). He 
describes his own experiences in order to make those listening to his lec-
ture "recall the same or similar experiences" -experiences like feeling 
"wonder at the existence of the world" or feeling absolutely safe or 
absolutely guilty. He writes that these experiences "seem to those who 
have experienced them, for instance to me, to have in some sense an intrin-
sic, absolute value" even though it is "nonsense to say they have absolute 
value" (PO, 43, italics mine). To repeat, "It is the paradox that an experi-
ence, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value." "Seeing the world 
as a miracle" (PO, 43) is such a paradoxical experience. We cannot express 
what we want to express, for we want to go beyond the world, beyond sig-
nificant language-and Wittgenstein concludes that "my whole tendency 
and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics 
or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language" (PO, 44). What 
"springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of 
life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science," although 
he" deeply" respects the tendency this documents. 
This echoes his remarks at the end of the Tractatus (1921). Most 
pertinent are the following: "If there is any value that does have value, it 
must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case"; 
"Ethics is transcendental" because "propositions can express nothing that 
is higher"; "How things are in the world is a matter of complete indiffer-
ence for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world"; "It is 
not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. To view 
the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole-a limited whole .. .it is 
this that is mystical."2< 
It might be thought that this appeaJ to absoluteness is one of the early 
commitments that Wittgenstein leaves behind. But even as late as the 
years between 1946 and 1950, he expresses an understanding of religion as 
an absolute perspective on the world. He notes that "only religion would 
have the power to destroy vanity and penetrate all the nooks and cran-
nies"(CV, 48 [1946]). He indicates the requirement of absoluteness inher-
ent in the grammar when he suggests that religious belief is not supposed 
to be a question of degree: he understands how someone could say "I 
never believed in God before," but he cannot w1.derstand what it would 
mean to say 'I never really believed in Him before'." (CV, 53 [1946]). 
Moreover, "If someone who believes in God looks round and asks 'Where 
does everything I see come from?', 'Where does all this come from?', he is 
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not craving for a (causal) explanation; and his question gets its point from 
being the expression of a certain craving. He is, namely, expressing an atti-
tude to all explanations" (CV, 85 [1950]). 
The notion of absoluteness which characterizes religion or God is found 
most markedly in the early writings, but it remains an important one for 
Wittgenstein. M. C'o. Drury emphasizes the importance of the lecture on 
ethics to Wittgenstein's thought in general when he concludes: "I am only 
wishing to maintain that alongside of these specific interests there is to be 
fotmd an ethical demand, if we are to understand the implications of his 
work to their full extent. It is this watching brief in the interests of the 
absolute that gives a depth to his work that I do not find in those who have 
followed after him or tried to simplify the complexity of his thought."2i 
The idea of the absolute may seem to call to mind the dogmatic appeal 
to determinacy which informed the Tractatlls. This may be what lies 
behind Churchill's comment that in Wittgenstein's criticisms of O'Hara 
there is a resurgence of "modified versions of the Tractatus's systematic dif-
ferentiation between religious discourse and other forms of language."2e 
However, the notion of the absolute perspective on the world does not 
need to be omitted from Wittgenstein's later account of religion because it 
doE'S not necessarily embody any of the Tractatus's philosophical purism, 
dogmatism, and requirements of determinacy; treating everything under 
the light of eternity does not conflict with the mind-set which sees vague-
ness and fuzzy edges as an integral dimension of human existence. Thus, 
it is possible to see Wittgenstein's later comments on religion as informed 
by this same early understanding of the higher, the transcendental, the 
paradoxical, as paradigmatically religious, and hence possible to see this 
norm at the heart of his critique of certain understandings of religion (like 
Fr. O'Hara's). 
But it has to be an observed norm, because only the observation of such 
a norm can authorize Wittgenstein's various challenges to certain believ-
er's own self-descriptions. On my reading, his normative standard is not a 
priori-it is not available to him before his experiences of religiousness. 
Wittgenstein is not proposing that there be a commitment to absoluteness 
in religion, but rather clarifying the commitment which he sees to be 
already there in religion. Thus Wittgenstein's source of normativity is 
found within religion itself, not brought in from outside religion. It is a 
posteriori in the sense that it is a description he makes on the basis of his 
data-the data being the religious practice, including its norm of absolute-
ness. But his normative standard is prior to any particular judgment he 
makes about a given element of a given religious practice. 
Both the Tractatus and the "Lecture on Ethics" (as well as material in the 
notebooks)27 show that Wittgenstein sees himself to be describing the com-
mon structure informing religious aspirations. This common structure is 
not a matter of essence, but rather a grasp of a family resemblance com-
monality (one based on similarity or connections) revealed by looking 
closely at a variety of religious expressions. Such a grasp of some structur-
al commonality is not a priori-it does not come prior to his experience of 
religion in practice. It is a posteriori-derived from experiences of reli-
gious piety (including, as we saw earlier, his own).28 Yet it is prior in that it 
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stands as normative before examination of particular instances which may 
then be evaluated according to it. 
v. The Implication of Absoluteness for the Relevance of Rational Justification 
On Wittgenstein's account, the first implication of a commitment to 
absoluteness is that it precludes prospective justification of belief in God. 
One cannot speak of God as an object, with the grammar appropriate to 
ordinary objects. Wittgenstein explicitly takes the possibility "that the exis-
tence of God can be proved by natural reason" to negate the absoluteness 
necessary; allowing such a proof would mean that one thinks of God "as 
another being like myself, outside myself, only infinitely more powerful," 
the kind of being Wittgenstein would feel it a "duty" to "defy."e" To sug-
gest that a commitment to God must itself be preceded and justified by a 
belief in God already assumes the use of the grammar which religion's 
dimension of absoluteness has distanced itself from. The depth of a com-
mitment to absoluteness is what provides the leverage for evaluating nega-
tively the kind of enterprise in which Fr. O'Hara engages-reasons, proofs 
for the existence of God.30 
That Wittgenstein is not importing a normative standard into religion is 
revealed in the comment I cited earlier: "But I think that what believers who 
have furnished such proofs [for the existence of God] have wanted to do is 
to give their 'belief' an intellectual analysis and foundation, although they 
themselves would never have come to believe as a result of such proofs" 
(CV, 85). Here he is accurately describing the way in which Aquinas, for 
example, draws out the implications of a commitment to absoluteness. For 
Aquinas, faith seeks understanding, but faith is primary; reason can issue 
in "preambles" to faith, but those preambles to faith are a far cry from the 
"articles of faith" in which the Triune, loving God of Christian faith is 
revealed. The conclusions of the five ways are not religious in any strict 
sense; Question 1 precedes Question 2 (which includes the five ways) for a 
reason-its sets the whole thing in the context of faith seeking understand-
ing.'! The relation of reason to faith, for Aquinas, is a retrospective one, not 
a prospective one: reason is used within the faith only in terms of elaborat-
ing the articles of faith and defending them from philosophical attack. In 
other words, Wittgenstein's accoLmt of religious normativity is supported 
to the extent that O'Hara's own acceptance of the sui generis nature of God 
and his practical refusal to let his reasoning be undermined coincide with 
the implications of the norm of absoluteness-implications which are 
drawn by Aquinas. The norm which Wittgenstein judges to be in tension 
with O'Hara's appeal to rational justification is precisely the norm to which 
Aquinas adheres. 
Wittgenstein also implies that a Kierkegaardian account of the relation 
between faith and history accurately draws out an implication of absolute-
ness. After a reference to Kierkegaard about scripture Wittgenstein writes: 
"God has four people recount the life of his incarnate Son, in each case dif-
ferently and with inconsistencies-but might we not say: It is important 
that this narrative should not be more than quite averagely historically 
plausible just so that this should not be taken as the essential, decisive 
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thing? So that the letter should not be believed more strongly than is prop-
er and the spirit may receive its due. I.e., what you are supposed to see 
carmot be communicated even by the best and most accurate historian; and 
therefore a mediocre account suffices, is even to be preferred. For that too 
can tell you what you are supposed to be told. The Spirit puts what is 
essential, essential for your life, into these words. The point is precisely 
that you are only SUPPOSED to see clearly what appears clearly even in 
this representation" (CV, 31-32 [1937]).32 His other remarks on the topic are 
clearly in the spirit of Kierkegaard: e.g., when he writes that "Christianity 
is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative 
and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appro-
priate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and thin, 
which you can only do as a result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don't 
take the same attitude toward it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a 
quite different place in your life for it." (CV, 32 [1937]) His conclusion is that 
"A believer's relation to these narratives is neither the relation to historical 
truth (probability), nor yet that to a theory consisting of 'truths of reason'. 
There is such a thing." (CV, 32 [1937]). The phrase "There is such a thing" 
indicates that he does not see himself to be prescribing that there be or not 
be such a thing, but describing the occurrence of such treatment. 
Wittgenstein is not prescribing this grammar, but observing elements of 
it deeply embedded within the practice of religion. In some cases the 
grammar is analyzed in ways that might so shock some believers that they 
can only find Wittgenstein's account to be illegitimately prescriptive rather 
than descriptive. For example, this happens when he points out the gram-
matical dimension in what may seem to be empirical claims: "The way you 
use the word 'God' does not show whom you mean-but, rather, what you 
mean." (CV, 50 [1946]); "God's essence is supposed to guarantee his exis-
tence-what this really means is that what is here at issue is not the exis-
tence of something." (CV, 82 [1949]). This latter claim, however, sounds 
like the drawing out of an implication with which Aquinas would agree. 
In any case, Wittgenstein anticipates the dissonance his grammatical inves-
tigation may cause: "Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory 
about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a 
description of something that actually takes place in human life. For 'con-
sciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through 
faith. Those who speak of such things (Bunyan for instance) are simply 
describing what has happened to them, whatever gloss anyone may want to 
put on it." (CV, 28 [1937] emphasis mine). 
He also describes Christian grammar as one which requires that reli-
gious beliefs be treated as both practical and passionate: 
I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doc-
trines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direc-
tion of your life.) It says that wisdom is all cold; and that you can no 
more use it for setting your life to rights than you can forge iron 
when it is cold. The point is that a sound doctrine need not take hold 
of you; you can follow it as you would a doctor's prescription.-But 
here you need something to move you and tum you in a new direc-
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tion. (Le., this is how I understand it.) Once you have been turned 
round, you must stay turned round. Wisdom is passionless. But 
faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. (CV, 53 [1946]).33 
His apparently prescriptive comment-"So if you want to stay within the 
religious sphere you must struggle" (CV, 86 [1950])-is an implication of 
the practical passion which is appropriate to seeing the world "sub specie 
aeterni." In the end, Wittgenstein is wanting to transform us, not by revis-
ing religious practice, but by highlighling the implications of the norm of 
absoluteness. 
VI. A Further Tmplication of Absoluteness 
It is time to consider a possible objection. One might agree that 
Wittgenstein's description of the norm of absoluteness found within 
O'Hara's religion (expressed both in his account of the sui generis nature of 
God and his practical refusal in principle to let his reasoning be under-
mined) is inconsistent with O'Hara's ostensible practice of relying on rea-
sons, and thus gives Wittgenstein warrant for his criticism of an appeal to 
rational justification. But one might still wonder whether the commitment 
to absoluteness isn't precisely the dimension of religion which precludes 
the relevance of Wittgenstein's general account of reference to religious 
practice. A large number of Wittgenstein's reminders in On Certainty are 
devoted to making us re-examine the question of 'agreement with reali-
ty'-namely, our deep tendency to ask "But does it certainly agree with 
reality, with the facts?"(OC, #191).34 When what we are looking for is some 
sort of link between our judgments and a reality independent of what our 
practices reveal as what we take to be true, when we try to tether our prac-
tices to some absolute yet determinate hitching-post, we are, he says, 
"going round in a circle." The very "idea of 'agreement with reality'" is 
problematical if we want to mean more than successful reference through 
our grammar, if we want to know that it is "really right" to rely on the evi-
dence of our senses or memory (OC, ##215, 201); the "very thing that is in 
question is what 'tallying' [with the facts] is here" (OC, #199). Is a 
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion possible, given Wittgenstein's stric-
tures on the kind of reference we can make? 
Jolm Hyman argues in a recent contribution that it is not. He writes: "it 
was one of the fundamental themes of Wittgenstein's later philosophy that 
the concepts we use cannot be justified by reference to reality ... So, if 
Wittgenstein is right, religious beliefs are not true or ji7lse, and they are not 
reasonable or unreasonable either ... [and they are] equally immune from fal-
sification and from verification."35 Hyman thus illustrates the view that a 
believer's commitment to absoluteness requires the believer to claim that 
the referent of religious belief must transcend all human practices, such 
that we would say that it would exist even if there were no humans or no 
world. The possibility of getting it 'really' right (or wrong) seems to be 
essential to religious believers. God as Creator transcends creation, so the 
attempt to refer to the Creator of all must succeed in referring to a reality in 
such a way that it gets it right in an absolute sense. It might seem then 
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that the same commitment to absoluteness which precludes talking about 
God with a grammar common to objects in the world also requires the 
believer to demand a 'Correlate' to "God" of precisely the sort that 
Wittgenstein says we cannot have in other cases. The religious believer 
might agree that human practices like banking and coronations (and 
maybe even art and morality) cannot be checked against an independent 
reality (they create the reality they refer to), but the same cannot be 
allowed for the reality which is the source of all human experience. 
No doubt some believers would argue that it is not enough to allow that 
the grammar of God-talk includes the rules of treating the reference to God 
as a reference to something independent of all human practices (i.e., the 
grammar is a grammar of transcendent reference). They might still want to 
say that somehow the attempt to refer to the Creator of all must succeed in 
referring to a reality in such a way that it gets it right in an absolute sense. 
It is not enough to say that one can get it wrong by failing to follow the 
grammar implied in the practice-some believers want to maintain a pos-
sibility of reference to something outside of human practice which could 
fail in an absolute sense, could fail because the grammar might not get it 
right, might not correspond to something to which it could have corre-
sponded.36 Believers might agree that there is no need for an absolute cor-
relate to the referent in banking because banking is not a practice con-
cemed with the absolute, whereas in the case of religion there must be a 
gap between the reference we make and the reference we want to make. 
To such a claim, Wittgenstein's response in his lectures on religious 
belief is applicable: "the mere fact that someone says they believe on evi-
dence" does not decide the matter (LC, 60). It is necessary to see how they 
treat their beliefs in the face of troubling challenges; it is necessary to see 
what else they do, what commitments they hold as well. One could con-
strue Wittgenstein's analysis of the reference we are able to make as one 
way of drawing out the implication of a commitment to absoluteness. The 
commitment to absoluteness does not require the determination of an 
absolute Correlate to "God"; in fact it seems to imply the inapplicability of 
any demand for an absolute Correlate. Absoluteness implies that one can-
not speak of God as if there is unconditioned or immediate revelation. 
Revelation is always mediated through human practice. Religious 
attempts to speak of God more directly, even immediately, amount to 
attempts to step outside the world, to speak from a point of view other 
than that available to human beings. Although we can imaginatively take 
up such a position, we should remember that it is one we cannot express. 
The demand for a Correlate goes against the recognition that we cannot 
speak of the source of all things as if it were one of those things. The very 
transcendence we desire to speak of undermines the possibility of speak-
ing of such a Correlate. 
The demand to go beyond the reference which we can succeed in mak-
ing by using the grammar of religious discourse expresses the imaginative 
assumption of a point outside the world at which we can stand to appreci-
ate the gap between the reference we make and the reference we want to 
make. We speak in the way we have to in order to understand our 
(human) experience. That is all we can understand. The philosophical 
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demand for a Correlate (whether from a religious believer or non-believer) 
localizes the referent, opposes it to the reality we experience. That is, 
although the commitment to absoluteness might seem to express itself in 
the need to put the reality of God outside all human practice, as if we could 
refer in a way other than through the grammar of religious discourse, the 
attempt to do so can be seen as a refusal to affirm our finitude, our lack of a 
point outside the world. 
Wittgenstein's comment that he "cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view"37 may be understood as affirming the sense 
in which he sees religion to be at heart a matter of absoluteness. I think it is 
plausible to argue that he maintains this early appreciation of absoluteness 
when he goes on in the lectures on religion to criticize ways of attempting 
to be religious which put techniques of conditionality in tension with the 
evident grammar of unconditionality and absoluteness. 
Wittgenstein's later references to 'language-games' do not rule out his 
continuing to see religion in terms of absolute value. In neither the 
Tractatus nor the "Lecture on Ethics" nor the lectures on religion does 
Wittgenstein speak of religious belief as a "language game." So it is read-
ing the Investigations back into the lectures inappropriately to see religion 
as a language game among others, comparable to language games like 
telling jokes or giving orders (PI, §23). If anything, religion involves many 
different language-games. In other words, Wittgenstein's account of reli-
gion, though often related to his discussions of different kinds of discourse, 
is better understood in terms of an absolute perspective on the world, or 
absolute value, than in terms of a language-game among others. 
VII. Paradox-"Seeing-as" 
The Wittgensteinian notion of 'seeing-as' can be developed in ways 
which support seeing religious language in terms of paradox,3" and this 
allows me to follow through on a Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion's 
orientation to the absolute. The Tractatus and the "Lechue on Ethics" both 
present a view of religion (ethics, aesthetics) as an all-encompassing per-
spective on life---a way of putting everything "sub specie aetemi," a mode 
of treating everything under the rubric of absoluteness or ultimacy. The 
grammar of relation to the absolute is not a grammar in competition with 
any other grammar-it is all-encompassing or it is nothing. As we saw, the 
"Lecture on Ethics" made clear that our attempts to speak about absolute 
value are paradoxical; we find there a description of the religious impulse, 
which results in paradoxicallanguage---an impulse which can no more be 
satisfied or completed, then it can be stifled. Moreover, Wittgenstein's 
repeated claim that the "urge to thrust against the limits of language" 
yields "nonsense" is explicitly connected by him to Kierkegaard when he 
writes that "Kierkegaard, too, recognized this thrust and even described it 
in much the same way (as a thrust against paradox).",9 
Still another way in which Wittgenstein's account seems to capture the 
impulse toward the absolute which marks a Kierkegaardian grammar of 
faith is found in his Tractarian references to how the ethical, the mystical, 
the religious, the sense of the world, the higher-all lie "outside the world" 
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(6.421):1I Wittgenstein's phrasing calls to mind a passage in Kierkegaard's 
journals: 
Faith is quite correctly 'the point outside the world' which therefore 
also moves the whole world. It is easy to perceive that what bursts 
forth through a negation of all points in the world is the point outside 
the world .... Consider the absurd. The negation of all concepts forces 
one outside the world, to the absurd-and here is faith.4! 
The lip oint outside the world II is, for Kierkegaard, lithe absurd"; for 
Wittgenstein such a perspective "will simply be nonsense." Kierkegaard 
commends faith, while locating it at the point of the "negation of all con-
cepts"; Wittgenstein respects faith because what is most valuable can only 
be expressed in terms which are best understood as attempts to express 
what he calls "paradox." 
Admittedly, Kierkegaard elaborates the appeal to paradox in a way that 
Wittgenstein does not, distinguishing between the paradox(es) of subjec-
tivity and the intensified paradox of Christian religious faith:2 Although 
one could argue that there is no qualitative difference between paradox-
es--paradox is a threshold concept, all or nothing-still Kierkegaard 
points to an important way in which the intensified Christian paradox is 
qualitatively different from paradoxes within immanence-the transcen-
dent revelation which breaks into immanence is the "absolutely different" 
in a way which does not apply to ordinary paradox. The seeming contra-
diction within ordinary paradox is a function of knowing both sides to be 
in opposition, which implies knowing both sides well enough to see that 
opposition. The intensified paradox differs from ordinary paradox 
because there is no determinate, knowable, context of opposition. 
Wittgenstein does not go into detail, but one can construe the 
Wittgensteinian paradox of seeing the "absolute" in the relative as parallel 
to the intensified paradox of which Kierkegaard speaks. 
Wittgenstein's early notion of paradox carries over into his later concern 
in the Investigations with the notion of the II dawning of an aspect" or 
"noticing an aspect." The "dawning of an aspect" is a paradoxical experi-
ence; it is the surprising experience of having what one describes as a new 
perception even while one acknowledges that nothing has changed in 
what is being observed:] What one sees is different but what is seen has 
not changed.44 One can understand religious conversion in these terms4S; 
the paradoxical dawning of an aspect is a hyperbolic moment in a religious 
seeing-as. In fact, his description of the II dawning of an aspect" bears 
strong echoes of the way Wittgenstein earlier described the paradoxical 
activity of trying to ascribe absolute value to things which are in fact con-
tingent. 
But Wittgenstein is also concerned to note that the continuous seeing of 
an aspect retains that paradoxicality:6 His reference in the "Lecture on 
Ethics" to "seeing the world as a miracle" (PO, 43) nicely parallels his earli-
er reference to "seeing [one's] life as a work of art created by God" (CVA 
[1930)), and both of these illustrate what it is to see an expression on a face 
rather than merely lines and color patches (LC, 34-35). Even in these cases 
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of continuous religious 'seeing-as' there is a paradox which, as Stephen 
Mulhall phrases it, "consists in the sense that the object perceived had 
changed in some way, even though none of its properties had altered."47 
Moreover, Mulhall's reference to the felt need to respond with an 
Ausserung seems to suggest a way of understanding the other person 
(imagining that felt need) without depriving the seeing-as of its paradoxi-
cality. Cora Diamond has suggested a parallel possibility on the basis of 
the "slight oddness" in Wittgenstein's formulation at the end of the 
Tractatus that "Anyone who understands me recognizes [my propositions] 
as nonsensical"-namely, the possibility of understanding the person who 
utters the nonsense. She explains that although we cannot understand 
what someone says who attempts to show what 'what cannot be said' 
shows, Wittgenstein allows that we can understand someone who attempts 
to say what 'what cannot be said' shows:8 We do this when we engage in 
"a kind of imaginative activity, an exercise of the capacity to enter into the 
taking of nonsense for sense, of the capacity to share imaginatively the 
inclination to think that one is thinking something in it."49 
***** 
In the end, there is reason to say that Wittgenstein's appeal to absolute-
ness, with its concomitant paradoxical indeterminacy, accurately describes 
a wide spectrum of religious positions. It accurately describes the norm 
informing Aquinas's conclusion that even "revelation does not tell us what 
God is, and thus joins us to him as to an unknown," as well as its paradoxi-
cal hope-"nevertheless it helps us to know him better."5o It also accurate-
ly describes Johannes Climacus's ethical appreciation of our relation to the 
divine: 
Whether it is a word, a sentence, a book, a man, a society, whatever it 
is, as soon as it is supposed to be a boundary, so that the boundary 
itself is not dialectical, it is superstition and narrow-mindedness. In a 
human being there is always a desire, at once comfortable and con-
cerned, to have something really firm and fixed that can exclude the 
dialectical, but this is cowardliness and fraudulence toward the 
divine.51 
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